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Migration Policy, Illegal Migrants,
Self-Selection and Brain Drain
Armando J. Garcia Pires y
Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration (NHH)
Abstract
We compare two migration policies: an open migration policy,
where all migrants can migrate legally; and a selective migration
policy, where migrants are selected according to skills. We show
that since the selective migration policy can create illegal migra-
tion, it has the following e¤ects relatively to the open migration
policy: (1) it weakens the chances of a positive self-selection of
skilled migrants; (2) it reduces the possibility of a benecial brain
gain; and (3) it dampens the e¤ectiveness of education policies.
Accordingly, since illegal migration can conduce to brain waste
(i.e.: skilled workers working as unskilled), the selective migration
policy reduces the incentives of individuals to acquire education
and of skilled workers to migrate.
Keywords: Illegal migration, self-selection, brain drain.
JEL Classication: F22, J61.
1 Introduction
In the last decade we have assisted in the developed world, in particular
in the United States (US) and in the European Union (EU), to a change
of focus in the migration policies. From one side, migration policies
stopped to be only directed to legal migrants and started to include
The idea for this paper came from discussions with Nicola Coniglio and Kjetil
Bjorvatn. I am also grateful to Agnar Sandmo, Davide Sala, Fernando Aragón,
Gerald Willmann, Gregory Corcos, Jiegen Wei, Karolina Ekholm, Philipp Schröder,
Simon Evenett, Jørgen Nielsen and Victor Norman for helpful comments during the
preparation of this work. The usual disclaimer, however, applies.
yAddress for correspondence: Armando J. Garcia Pires, Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration (NHH), Institute for Research in Economics
and Business Administration (SNF), Breiviksveien 40, 5045 Bergen, Norway. Tel:
+(47)55959622, Fax: +(47)55959439; E-mail: armando.pires@snf.no.
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also illegal migrants (Hanson, 2006)1. From other side most developed
countries launched some type of selective migration policies to attract
skilled workers (Bauer et al., 2000)2.
Illegal migration is a concern for developed countries mostly because
of the numbers involved. For example, Passel (2005) estimates that in
the US total illegal immigrant population has increased from 9.3 mil-
lion in 2002 to 10.3 million in 2004 and that illegal migration ows are
around 500,000 per year. Comparable gures have also been found for
the EU (Jandl, 2004). Given that illegal migration is seen as something
undesirable because of a set of negative externalities for the receiving
migration country (for example, the creation of a "grey" economy or
increase in crime rates), most developed countries have putted in place
a set of policies to ght illegal migration. An extreme example of these
policies is the debate in the US on the militarization of the Mexico-US
border, in order to reduce illegal migration from Mexico to US. In the
EU similar measures have been proposed in relation to illegal migrants
from the North of Africa.
In turn, the interest on selective migration policies relates with a
public debate in most developed countries on the "quality" of migrants.
By "quality" of migrants, politicians and the media usually mean if
migrants are skilled or unskilled workers, with the former being the
"quality" migrants. Accordingly, by using selective migration policies
developed countries expect to attract more skilled workers. The idea
behind selective migration policies is that in a globalized world, inter-
national competitiveness can only be achieved by attracting the more
qualied brains. In the same way illegal migrants can create negative
externalities, it is believed that skilled migrants promote positive ex-
ternalities for the hosting economy (for example, increase in economic
growth through an increase in the stock of human capital stock and in
the level of knowledge spillovers).
The issue of the selectivity of migrants is not new in economics. In
fact, there is a whole literature on self-selection, which main research
question is if skilled individuals positively self-select to migration. The
dominant view, which nds a high degree of support from empirical work,
is that there is a tendency towards a positive self-selection (Schultz, 1975
and Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005). The positive self-selection is due to
1Illegal migration can be dened as the immigration that violates the immigration
laws of the destination country. For example an immigrant that enters illegally in a
country or an immigrant with an expired visa
2Selective migration policies make it easier for skilled workers to get a legal migra-
tion visa relatively to unskilled ones. One well known example of a selective migration
policy is the Canadas point system.
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the fact that, when compared to the unskilled, skilled individuals have
lower migration costs and higher returns from migration3.
In the other side of the coin, however, is the developing world. De-
veloping countries have also expressed apprehension about illegal migra-
tion, but their main concern is the "quality" of the migrants that leave
to work abroad. Accordingly, while developed countries want to attract
skilled workers, developing countries do not want to lose them. In fact,
the traditional view in economics is that international migration leads
developing countries to lose high-skilled workers to developed countries,
due to higher wages in the latter (Grubel and Scott, 1966 and Bhagwati
and Hamada, 1974). The economic literature has labeled this as the
brain drain phenomenon4. In view of that, brain drain is detrimental
to poor countries through a set of negative externalities (for example,
reduced productivity of those left behind, higher costs of public goods
and loss of the investment made in human capital formation).
Recent contributions, in turn, argue that the negative brain drain
story does not necessarily need to hold (Docquier and Rapoport, 2007).
Accordingly, in a developing economy closed to international labor ows,
the returns to education are very low and this discourages individuals
to invest in education. However, if an individual is able to migrate to a
high wage developed country, he might have extra incentives to acquire
education relatively to autarchy. Migration, in this sense, increases the
returns to education. This new view then defends that while migration
opens the door for a negative brain drain, in some cases this negative
e¤ect might be o¤set by a benecial brain gain due to an increase in
the incentives of natives to acquire human capital. Therefore, migration
conduces to a negative brain drain when the number of people that
acquire education does not compensate for the number of skilled people
that migrate. Conversely, a positive brain gain arises when the number
of people that acquire education more than o¤sets the number of skilled
people that migrate.
In particular the literature on benecial brain gain presents three
main mechanisms that can allow a developing country to achieve a pos-
itive brain gain: return migration (Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay, 2003
and Stark et al., 1997); remittances (Cox Edwards and Ureta, 2003); and
uncertain migration status (Mountford, 1997 and Beine et al., 2001)5.
3A recent view, however, defends that the possibility of a positive self-selection
is less likely for non-economic migrants (as refugees) and short-term migrants (as
seasonal workers). See Borjas (1987) and Chiswick (1999).
4A controversial example of brain drain is that of African doctors that migrate
to work in developed countries, i.e.: the developed world has the benets of African
skilled migrants without paying for their education (World Bank, 2006).
5Uncertainty migration status refers to the uncertainty that an individual faces
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Accordingly, the possibility of a benecial brain gain is increased if: the
ow of skilled workers returnees is su¢ ciently high (return migration
channel); if remittances reduce substantially liquidity constraints in the
education of the younger (remittances channel); and if many individuals
that have invested in human capital do not migrate because they do not
get legal status (uncertain migration status channel)6.
With the discussion above in mind, in this paper we look at four
interlinked phenomena: migration policy, illegal migration, brain drain
and self-selection. Our starting point is that migration policies a¤ect
illegal migration ows. In fact, it is argued that very restrictive policies
have as a consequence to increase illegal migration (Hanson, 2006). In
addition, we know that illegal migrants are subject to a di¤erent set of
constrains from legal ones. In particular, a skilled worker that migrates
illegally has probably no other choice than to work as unskilled. In other
words, a skilled illegal migrant is subject to brain waste (i.e.: a reduction
of migrantsrewards to skills in the destination country)7. However, to
our knowledge, the economic literature on brain drain and self-selection
has focused the attention only on legal migration. Given this, our aim
is to analyze the e¤ects of migration policies and illegal migration: (1)
on education decisions, (2) on self-selection, (3) and on brain drain.
The motivation for this research comes from a set of empirical facts
on illegal migration. First, Rivera-Batiz (1999) and Kossoudji and Cobb-
Clark (2002) show that illegal immigrants from Mexico in the US have
a signicant wage penalty relatively to legal migrants and that, as a
result, the returns to human capital are much higher for Mexican legal
immigrants than for illegal ones. Second, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005),
Hanson (2006), Mckenzie and Rapoport (2007) and Orrenius and Za-
vodny (2005) present evidence of a positive self-selection for immigrants
with up to nine years of education but of a negative self-selection for
immigrants with more than nine years of education. They attribute
this pattern, at least in part, to illegal migration. Third, Mckenzie and
Rapoport (2006) and de Brauw and Giles (2006) nd evidence of a sig-
nicant negative e¤ect of illegal migration on schooling attendance and
attainments in rural Mexico and in rural China. Accordingly, in a con-
text where the chances to be able to migrate legally are very low, the
prospect of migration do not necessarily increase education incentives.
when asking for a legal migration visa. In particular it is assumed that individuals
that do not obtain legal visa do not migrate. In our paper, on the contrary, we allow
individuals with no legal visa to migrate illegally.
6See Commander et al. (2004) for a comprehensive review of the various channels
through which a benecial brain gain can arise.
7Coniglio et al. (2006) and Mattoo et al. (2007) report that brain waste is indeed
a signicant phenomenon for skilled illegal migrants.
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In this paper we then check the robustness of the positive self-selection
and the benecial brain gain arguments to illegal migration and migra-
tion policy. In particular, we compare a selective migration policy (where
migrants are selected according to skills), with an open migration pol-
icy (where all migrants can enter legally in one country). We show that
since the former can create illegal migration, a selective migration policy
has the following e¤ects relatively to an open migration policy: (1) it
weakens the chances for a positive self-selection; (2) it reduces the pos-
sibility of a benecial brain gain; and (3) it dampens the e¤ectiveness
of education policies. Accordingly, since illegal migration can conduce
to brain waste (i.e.: skilled workers working as unskilled), a selective
migration policy potentiates a brain waste risk for skilled migrants8.
Therefore, not only selective migration policies might not be e¤ective
for developed countries to attract skilled-workers, but these policies can
also hurt human capital formation in the developing world.
2 The Model
The model in this section is based on Docquier and Rapoports (2007)
stylized model on self-selection and brain-drain. To Docquier and Rapoport
(2007) we add migration policy (in particular, an open and a selective
migration policy) and illegal migration. The world economy is made up
of two countries: the origin and the destination migration country. We
focus in the origin migration country, which is a small developing open
economy, and we treat as exogenous the destination migration coun-
try, which is a developed economy (see table 1 for a summary of the
parameters used in the model)9.
By construction, results in terms of brain drain and the education
incentives of migration are mostly relevant to developing countries. How-
ever, results relative to the self-selection of skilled migrants are also of
interest to developed countries. In fact, as discussed in the introduction,
this is one of the main objectives behind selective migration policies.
8The brain waste risk refers to the uncertainty that skilled workers face when
migrating without knowing their future legal status. Accordingly, skilled migrants
run the risk of not getting legal status and to end up working as unskilled with the
associated wage penalty (i.e.: brain waste). In this sense, the uncertainty associated
with the brain waste risk di¤ers from the uncertain migration status case above. In
the uncertain migration status case, an individual with no legal visa does not migrate,
and therefore does not face a brain waste risk.
9In a subsequent section we discuss the case with more than one destination
migration country.
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1<h<2 Skill premium
0<c<1 Education costs
0<t<1 Wage penalty for illegal migrants
0<k<1 Migration costs
0<r<1 Migration costs penalty for illegal migrants
0<g<1 % of migrant’s second period working life spent in the destination country
0<Z<1 Education subsidy rate
0<T<1 Education tax rate
Figure 1: Parameters in the model
2.1 Production, Human Capital and Wages
Individuals in the origin country live and work for 2 periods, t = 1; 2.
In the rst period, all individuals work as unskilled, but they can also
choose to take education simultaneously. Therefore in the rst period,
besides working, an individual chooses either to get education in order to
become a skilled worker (S) or to not get education and stay unskilled
(U). In the second period, all individuals work according to the skill
level acquired in the rst stage, but they can decide where to work (in
the origin or in the destination country). As explain below, if individuals
decide to migrate, they can end up migrating legally or illegally.
Labor supply in period t in the origin country equals the amount of
unskilled and skilled labor available in the economy:
Lt = Ut + St (1)
We consider a very simple linear production function:
Yt = wtEt (2)
Where wt is the wage rate. In turn, Et is labor in ine¢ cient units
and equals:
Et = Ut + hSt (3)
Where h > 1 is the skilled productivity premium, which is individual
specic. Skilled workers are then heterogeneous in productivity10.
The stock of human capital can then be written as:
Ht =
Et
Lt
=
Ut + hSt
Ut + St
= 1 + Pt (h  1) (4)
10We ignore all the issues related with principal-agent wage models, where workers
productivity is imperfectly observed (see Stark et al., 1997).
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Where Pt is the proportion of skilled workers in the origin country:
Pt =
St
Ut + St
(5)
With this formalization we want to capture the idea of positive
spillovers on human capital formation.
2.2 Individual Education Choices: Autarchy
In order to illustrate the education incentives of individuals, we consider
rst an autarchy scenario with no migration in the second period. If
in the rst period an individual only works, his wage rate is then w1.
In turn, if in the rst period an individual besides working also takes
education, he has to pay the education costs cw1, with 0 < c < 1.
The parameter c is, then, the opportunity costs of education, which
is individual specic. Therefore, individuals are heterogeneous on the
ability to learn.
In the second period all individuals just work. Unskilled workers
will earn w2 and skilled workers hw2. As such, the condition to acquire
education in autarchy is just:
(1  c)w1 + hw2 > w1 + w2 (6)
In the steady state when w1 = w2  w this condition simplies to:
c < cAut  h  1 (7)
Where the sub-script Aut stands for autarchy. In other words, all
individuals with c < cAut will acquire education. It can be easily noted
that in order to obtain interior solutions we need that h 2 ]1; 2[. If
otherwise, all individuals would have incentives to acquire education.
2.3 Individual Migration Choices: Open Economy
In an open economy, in terms of international migration, at the end of
period 1 an individual can decide to migrate abroad. In the destination
country the wage per-e¢ ciency units for natives is w > w. We consider
w to be exogenous to the model. In addition, the wage premium for
skilled workers in the destination country is the same as in the origin
country (i.e.: h = h)11.
When an individual migrates legally, his wage is going to be the same
as for natives from the destination country, i.e.: w if he is unskilled and
hw if he is skilled. When an individual migrates illegally, however, he
su¤ers a wage penalty w, with 0 <  < 1. The parameter  intends to
11Results are not changed substantially if h 6= h.
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capture the wage losses of illegal migrants with respect to legal ones12.
Furthermore, under illegal migration a skilled illegal migrant cannot use
his skills in the destination country, i.e.: a skilled illegal migrant is the
same as an unskilled illegal migrant. In this sense, and by assumption,
illegal skilled migrants are subjected to brain waste, i.e.: w < hw.
In addition, migration is costly. Migration costs include not only
the monetary cost to move from one country to another, but also other
costs such as those related with adapting to a new culture and being
away from dear ones. Accordingly, we assume that legal migrants incur
in kw, with 0 < k < 1; and illegal migrants incur in kw, with  > 1.
In other words, we allow for higher migration costs for illegal migrants
in relation to legal ones13.
2.4 Open versus Selective Migration Policies
In the second stage an individual migrates if, and only if, the gains from
migration are larger than the benets of not migrating. As usual in the
brain drain literature, we consider only one channel for benecial brain
gain: temporary migration14. We then assume that migrants spend a
share  of their second period working life in the destination country
and 1   as returnees15.
Additionally, we compare two alternative migration policies by the
destination migration country: an open migration policy, and a selective
migration policy. In the open migration policy, all individuals can mi-
grate legally. Then, for skilled and unskilled workers the probability of
getting a legal visa can be dened as pS = pU = 1, respectively.
In turn, in the selective migration policy, skilled workers are favored
in relation to unskilled ones. In particular, we consider that the destina-
tion migration country only awards legal status to some skilled workers.
We then assume that skilled workers have a probability pS 2 (0; 1) of
getting a legal visa (and a probability (1  pS) 2 (0; 1) of being unsuc-
cessful in getting a legal visa). Unskilled workers on the contrary have
12Empirical evidence in fact shows that, relatively to legal migrants, illegal mi-
grants are paid lower wages, have poor working conditions and are more subject
to violations of the protections a¤orded by the destination country labor laws (see
Rivera-Batiz, 1999; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002; and Vayrynen 2003).
13The available empirical evidence seems to support this assumption (see Salt and
Stein, 1997). In addition, results do not change if  = 1.
14Temporary migration ts well with illegal migration, given that as defended by
Chiswick (2001) illegal migration is by nature temporary. This is so, not only because
illegal migrants aim at becoming legal, but also because they usually remain in the
destination country for shorter periods than legal migrants.
15Below we are going to discuss the robustness of our results to the other two
benecial brain gain channels mentioned in the introduction: uncertain migration
status and remittances.
8
a probability pU = 0 of getting a legal visa16. Therefore, with a selec-
tive migration policy, unskilled individuals can only migrate illegally; in
turn, skilled individuals can either migrate legally or illegally17.
In this sense, the migration decision here has a di¤erent type of
uncertainty from the uncertain migration status case discuss in the in-
troduction (see also Docquier and Rapoport, 2007). In the uncertain
migration status case, if an individual does not get legal status, he does
not migrate, i.e.: an individual is uncertain about his migration deci-
sion, which depends on legal status. In our paper, if an individual does
not get legal status, he migrates illegally, i.e.: an individual is uncer-
tainty about his legal status, and therefore his earnings, but not about
his migration decision. However, the uncertainty in relation to earnings
introduces a brain waste risk for skilled workers. Accordingly, a skilled
individual that decides to migrate might end up migrating illegally and
as a result with lower returns to skills (i.e.: brain waste)18.
For a given individual, then, the life time income for alternative mi-
gration choices, under both the open and the selective migration policies,
is as follow:
I (U;NM) = w1 + w2
I (U;MI) =
w1 + pUw
 (   k) + (1  pU)w (   k) + (1  )w2
I (S;NM) = (1  c)w1 + hw2
I (S;MI) =
(1  c)w1 + pSw (h  k) + (1  pS)w (   k) + (1  )hw2 (8)
Where NM stands for non-migration and MI for migration.
3 Open Migration Policy
Under the open migration policy all individuals can migrate legally, i.e.:
pS = pU = p = 1. We are going to show that this policy has the following
16Accordingly, for our results to hold we just need that pS > pU .
17It is not correct to think that only the unskilled migrate illegally. Coniglio et al.
(2006), on a survey on illegal migrants in Italy, report that 30% had secondary school
(9 years of schooling), 22% high-school (12 years of schooling) and 5% University (16
or more years of schooling). Hanson (2006) estimates similar education characteristics
for illegal migrants from Mexico in the US.
18As we discuss below, allowing for the same type of uncertainty as in the uncer-
tain migration status case (for example letting some potential migrants to give up
migration if they do not get legal status) does not change our results.
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e¤ects: it increases the incentives to acquire education; it promotes a
positive self-selection; and it contributes to a benecial brain gain19.
3.1 Self-Selection
At the steady state a skilled and an unskilled worker will migrate if and
only if, respectively20:
Sp=1 :h (!   1) > k!
Up=1 :  (!   1) > k! (9)
From here results that relation between skilled and unskilled workers
incentives to migrate is:
Sp=1   Up=1 =  (!   1) (h  1) > 0 (10)
Under the open migration policy, therefore, a skilled worker has al-
ways more incentives to migrate than an unskilled worker. However, in
order to have a positive self-selection (i.e.: only the skilled migrate)
we need that the Sp=1 condition is satised but the Up=1 condition
is not (equation 9). This is the case if I (U;MI) < I (U;NM) and
I (S;MI) > I (S;NM), or:
! (   k) + (1  ) < 1 < !     k
h

+ (1  ) (11)
We can then see that a positive self-selection is promoted when the
returns to skills (h) are high21.
In order to follow the brain drain literature, in the rest of this section
we assume that equation 11 is always satised. The positive self-selection
condition is necessary for two reasons. First, and as can be seen from
equations 9 and 11, we eliminate corner solutions where all individu-
als migrate. This is so, because unskilled workers do not migrate, and
only some skilled workers migrate, given that they are asymmetric on
h. Second, and as we are going to prove below, migration increases the
incentives of individuals to acquire education. As a consequence, this
opens the door for a benecial brain gain.
19In this section we basically reproduce Docquier and Rapoports (2007) results.
The only di¤erence is that we interpret them in terms of an open migration policy.
20The subscript p = 1 indicates open migration policy.
21Only h can promote a positive self-selection, since it is the only parameter that
a¤ects skilled and unskilled workersmigration decisions asymmetrically; all the other
parameters (!,  and k) work symmetrically for the two groups.
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3.2 Migration and Education Incentives
With the open migration policy only the following individuals will ac-
quire education (compare I (S;MI) with I (U;NM)):
c < cp=1  ! (h  k) + (1  )h  1 (12)
To check if migration increases the education incentives of natives
relatively to autarchy, we compare equations 12 and 7:
cp=1   cAut = h (!   1)  !k > 0 (13)
As long as the positive self-selection condition holds (equations 9 and
11), then as expected, the incentives to acquire education under the open
migration policy are higher than under autarchy.
3.3 Brain Drain or Brain Gain?
With the open migration policy, assuming a uniform distribution of abil-
ities, the proportion of educated workers in the origin country is:
Pp=1 =
(1  ) cp=1
1  cp=1 (14)
The possibility of a benecial brain gain emerges if the derivative of
P with respect to  is positive at the skilled workersthreshold level of
migration (equation 9):h
dPp=1
d
i
h(! 1)=k!
= (h 1)(h 2)+h(! 1) k!
(1 (h 1))2 (15)
It is straightforward to note that: rst, the sign of the previous
expression depends only on the numerator since the denominator is
always positive; and second, the sign of the numerator is determined
by the parameters !, k and h. In particular, and making p=1 =
(h  1) (h  2) + h (!   1)  k!, we can show that:
d(p=1)
d!
=h  k > 0
dp=1
dk
= ! < 0
dp=1
dh
=!   2 (2  h) 7 0 (16)
As such, the skill premium (h) has an ambiguous e¤ect on brain
drain22. In turn, high relative wage destination-origin (!) and low mi-
gration costs (k) contribute for a benecial brain gain.
22Accordingly, h only contributes positively for a benecial brain drain for high !.
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4 Selective Migration Policy
Under the selective migration policy, unskilled individuals can only mi-
grate illegally, since pU = 0; skilled workers, in turn, might either mi-
grate legally or illegally, given that pS 2 (0; 1). We are going to show
that results from the open migration policy are weakened with the se-
lective migration policy, due to the existence of illegal migration. We
proceed in the same fashion as above, rst looking at self-selection, then
education incentives and lastly brain drain.
4.1 Self-Selection
At the steady state the conditions for a skilled and an unskilled worker
to migrate are, respectively23:
SpS2(0;1) :  (h (pS!   1) + ! (1  pS)) > k! (pS + (1  pS) )
UpU=0 :  (!   1) > k! (17)
The relation between skilled and unskilled workersincentives to mi-
grate is therefore:
SpS2(0;1)   UpU=0 = pS! ( (h  ) + k (  1))   (h  1) (18)
It can be easily checked that skilled workers might not have more
incentives to migrate than the unskilled ones, i.e.: SpS2(0;1) 7 UpU=0.
This contrasts with the open migration policy where skilled individuals
always have higher incentives to migrate than the unskilled (equation
10). In particular, under the selective migration policy a positive self-
selection is not guaranteed when the probability of getting legal status
is low (low pS), the relative wage destination-origin is low (low !), the
migration costs are low (low k), the migration costs penalty for illegal
migrants is low (low ) and the wage penalty for illegal migrants is low
(high ). In turn, the e¤ects of the skill premium (h) and of temporary
migration () are ambiguous24. Given that migration incentives are
primarily inuenced by parameters linked to illegal migration (pS,  and
), we can then assert that illegal migration plays an important role in
reducing skilled workers incentives to migrate relatively to the unskilled.
What the above tells us is that selective migration policies might not
be the more appropriate policy tool to attract skilled workers. Some
23The subscripts pS 2 (0; 1) and pU = 0 indicate selective migration policy.
24Accordingly, h and  only increase the incentives of skilled workers to migrate
relatively to the unskilled if pS and ! are high.
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studies have in fact showed that for example Canadas selective mi-
gration policy has not been very e¤ective in promoting a positive self-
selection (Borjas, 1993; Wright and Maxim, 1993; Green and Green,
1995 and Bloom et al., 1995)25. Similarly, Barret (1998) presents evi-
dence that if a country does not use selective migration policies, it does
not necessarily attracts a lower inow of skilled workers than countries
that use such policies. Our results point out that this might result from
the brain waste risk of illegal status that the skilled face when migrating
to a country with a selective migration policy.
In any case, for having a positive self-selection we need that Sp=1
is satised but Up=1 is not. This is so if I (U;MI) < I (U;NM) and
I (S;MI) > I (S;NM), or:
! (   k)+(1  ) < 1 < pS!
 
   k
h

+(1  pS) !h (   k)+(1  )
(19)
Since under the selective migration policy, and due to illegal migra-
tion, skilled workers might not have more incentives to migrate than
the unskilled (equation 18), then also the possibility of a positive self-
selection is reduced. This is in particular the case when the probability
of skilled workers to get legal status (pS) is low. Further note that rel-
atively to the open migration policy, now the skill premium (h) has an
ambiguous e¤ect on self-selection. For one side, h promotes a positive
self-selection due to the possibility of legal status (rst term on the right
hand side of equation 19: pS!
 
   k
h

), but from other side it reduces a
positive self-selection due to the possibility of illegal status (second term
on the right hand side of equation 19: (1  pS) !h (   k))26.
For the same reasons as for the open migration policy, in the rest of
this section we assume that equation 19 is always satised. We want to
study education incentives and brain drain when the selective migration
policy supports a positive self-selection since the opposite case is not in-
teresting, i.e.: with a negative self-selection migration does not promote
education and brain drain.
4.2 Migration and Education Incentives
With the selective migration policy, only the following individuals will
acquire education:
25Canadas point system was introduced in 1967. Therefore Canada was one of
the rst countries to introduce a migration policy based on labor market criteria.
26From equation 19 we can also note that the remaining parameters (k,  , !, 
and ) cannot a¤ect self-selection, since they promote migration symmetrically for
unskilled and skilled workers.
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c < cpS2(0;1)  ! (pS (h  k) + (1  pS) (   k))+(1  )h 1 (20)
The rst question we must ask is if migration increases education
incentives relatively to autarchy. To do this we compare equation 20
with equation 7:
cpS2(0;1)   cAut =  (h (pS!   1) + (1  pS)!)  !k ((1  pS) + pS)
(21)
Then, as for the open migration policy and as it should be expected,
as long as the positive self-selection condition holds (equations 17 and
19), the incentives to acquire education under the selective migration
policy are higher than under autarchy.
More interesting however is to evaluate the education incentives un-
der the open migration policy and under the selective migration. To
check this we compare equation 12 with equation 20:
cp=1   cpS2(0;1) = (1  pS)! ( (h  ) + k (  1)) > 0 (22)
Relatively to the open migration policy, then, the selective migration
policy reduces the incentives of individuals to acquire education27. The
rationale behind this result is that since the selective migration policy
might relegate skilled migrants to the illegal status, they run the risk
of brain waste. Accordingly, given that brain waste reduces the returns
to education, it also reduces education incentives. This e¤ect seems to
be conrmed empirically, as we have discussed in the introduction, by
Mckenzie and Rapoport (2006) and de Brauw and Giles (2006) for rural
migration from Mexico and China.
The disincentive to acquire education, which arises under the pos-
sibility of illegal migration, is central in this paper because: rst, it is
the main force operating behind our results; and second, it is also what
makes our results robust to alternative benecial brain gain channels
and to the possibility of amnesties for illegal migrants.
4.3 Brain Drain or Brain Gain?
With the selective migration policy, assuming a uniform distribution of
abilities, the proportion of educated workers in the origin country is:
27Note that this depends only on illegal migration. Accordingly, temporary migra-
tion does not play a role, i.e.: even for  = 1 (permanent migration) the previous
conclusion holds.
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PpS2(0;1) =
(1  ) cpS2(0;1)
1  cpS2(0;1)
(23)
The possibility of a benecial brain gain emerges if the derivative of
P with respect to  is positive at the skilled workersthreshold level of
migration (equation 17):
h
dPpS2(0;1)
d
i
(!(pSh+(1 pS)) h)=k!(pS+(1 pS))
=
(h 1)(h 2)+h(pS! 1)+!(1 pS) k!(pS+(1 pS))
1  (h 1)( ( 1)pS)
pS+(1 pS)
2 (24)
To analyze the e¤ects of the di¤erent parameters on brain drain under
the selective migration policy, note rst that the sign of equation 24
depends only in the numerator since the denominator is always positive.
By computing the derivative of the numerator of equation 24 we obtain
the following relations (for the sake of notation, we make the numerator
of equation 24 equal to pS2(0;1)):
d(pS2(0;1))
dpS
=! (h   + k (  1)) > 0
d(pS2(0;1))
d!
=  + pS (h  )  k (  pS (  1)) 7 0
d(pS2(0;1))
dk
= ! (  pS (  1)) < 0
d(pS2(0;1))
d
=! (1  pS) > 0
d(pS2(0;1))
d
= k! (1  pS) < 0
d(pS2(0;1))
dh
= pS!   2 (2  h) 7 0 (25)
Note rst that relatively to the open migration policy, under the se-
lective migration policy not only the skill premium (h) has an ambiguous
inuence on brain drain, but now that is also the case for the relative
wage destination-origin (!)28. In turn, high probability of getting legal
status (high pS), low wage penalty for illegal status (high ), low migra-
tion costs (low k) and low migration costs penalty for illegal migrants
(low ) can promote a benecial brain gain. The reverse happens for
28The inuence of h on brain drain depends on ! and pS , i.e.: h only contributes
for a benecial brain gain for high ! and high pS . The inuence of ! on brain drain
depends on pS ,  and k, i.e.: ! only contributes for a benecial brain gain for high
 , high pS and low k.
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low pS, low  , high k and high , i.e.: when illegal migration becomes
more relevant a negative brain drain might arise.
In this sense, this result may help to explain Beines et al. (2008)
empirical evidence on brain drain. In particular, Beine et al. (2008)
show that the countries with a negative brain drain are mostly located
in Africa and Latin America. In addition, available empirical evidence
also indicates that these two regions have high rates of illegal migration
(Hanson, 2006 and Coniglio et al., 2006). Then, if the brain waste mech-
anism presented in this paper is at work in Africa and Latin America,
illegal migration might be partially responsible for the negative brain
drain observed in these regions.
Other central issue is to evaluate brain drain outcomes under the
open migration policy and under the selective migration policy. To check
this we compare equation 15 with equation 24:
h
dPp=1
d
i
h(! 1)=k!
 
h
dPpS2(0;1)
d
i
(!(pSh+(1 pS)) h)=k!(pS+(1 pS))
=
! (1  pS) (h )+k( 1)(1 (h 1))2 > 0 (26)
We can then see that, relatively to the open migration policy, the
selective migration policy reduces the chances of a benecial brain gain.
Accordingly, under the selective migration policy, and due to illegal mi-
gration, education incentives triggered by migration are weakened rel-
atively to the open migration policy. In this sense, selective migration
policies in developed countries can a¤ect negatively any positive e¤ects
that could potentially come through international migration.
5 Education Policy
In this section we analyze if an education policy can increase the chances
of a benecial brain gain relatively to a scenario with no education pol-
icy. For simplicity, as in Docquier and Rapoport (2007), we assume that
migration costs are zero. The consequence of having k = 0 is that, inde-
pendently of education policy, migration will always promote a benecial
brain gain. However, the important point for education policies is not if
migration promotes a benecial brain gain (since this depends crucially
on migration costs), but if an education policy can promote more bene-
cial brain gain than in the absence of an education policy. Since results
for this last issue are not a¤ected by migration costs, we exclude them.
In the education policy scenario, following Docquier and Rapoport
(2007), we assume that the government in the origin country collects an
income tax on the educated and the uneducated adults that remain in
the country. We express this tax in terms of skilled workerswages, Thw,
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with T denoting the tax rate. The tax is used to nance an education
subsidy, which is allocated to each young opting to take education. We
express the education subsidy in terms of the local wage Zw, where Z
denotes the subsidy rate29.
With an education policy, the life income for alternative migration
choices is then30:
I (U;NM)T = w1 + w2 (1  Th)
I (U;MI)T = w1 + w
 (pU + (1  pU) ) + (1  )w2 (1  Th)
I (S;NM)T = (1  c+ Z)w1 + hw2 (1  T )
I (S;MI)T = (1  c+ Z)w1 + w (hpS + (1  pS) ) + (1  )hw2 (1  T )
(27)
Under the education policy, the closed economy critical level of edu-
cation becomes:
c < cTAut  h  1 + Z (28)
In order to obtain interior solutions for the education policy case, we
need to assume that (h+ Z) 2 ]1; 2[. Otherwise all individuals would
have incentives to acquire education.
For the no education policy scenario, in turn, the life time income
for alternative migration choices is as in equation 7 with k = 0 and the
closed economy critical level of education is as in equation 8.
Next we compare the education policy and the no education policy
scenarios. This exercise is done for both the open and the selective
migration policies. We are going to show that, under the open migration
policy, the education policy of the origin country always promotes a
higher benecial brain gain than in the absence of it. However, this
result might not necessarily hold under the selective migration policy,
due once again to illegal migration. Furthermore, under the selective
migration policy the possibility for the education policy to promote a
benecial brain drain is reduced in relation to the open migration policy.
5.1 Education Policy: Open Migration Policy
For the open migration policy, we start by dening the migration con-
ditions for skilled and unskilled workers. In the education and the no
29Implicitly we are assuming that the government budget is balanced and that
there is no need for scal adjustments due to migration. Introducing these issues
would not qualitatively change the results.
30The upper-script T refers to the "education policy" case. The upper-script T = 0
refers to the "no education policy" case.
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education policy scenarios we have respectively:
STp=1 :! > 1  T
UTp=1 :! > 1  hT
ST=0p=1 :! > 1
UT=0p=1 :! > 1 (29)
As a result, only the following individuals will acquire education:
c < cTp=1  !h+ (1  )h (1  T ) + Z + Th  1
c < cT=0p=1  h (! + (1  ))  1 (30)
From here it is straightforward to nd P Tp=1 and P
T=0
p=1 . To study
brain drain, we compute the derivatives of P Tp=1 and P
T=0
p=1 with respect
to !. In both cases the derivatives are evaluated at the skilled workers
migration threshold level (equation 29):h
dPTp=1
d!
i
!=1 T
=
(1  ) h
(1   (h+ Z   1))2 > 0h
dPT=0p=1
d!
i
!=1
=
(1  ) h
(1   (h  1))2 > 0 (31)
Given that these two derivatives are positive, then irrespective of
education policy, migration always promotes a benecial brain gain. As
discussed above, the reason for this result is that migration costs are
zero. As such, the only interesting thing to know when k = 0 is if the
education policy promotes a higher level of benecial brain gain than the
no education policy case. Comparing the brain drain conditions under
the education policy and under the no education policy, we obtain:
h
dPTp=1
d!
i
!=1 T
 
h
dPT=0p=1
d!
i
!=1
= (1  ) 2hZ (1 (h+Z 1))+(1 (h 1))
(1 (h+Z 1))2(1 (h 1))2 > 0
(32)
Therefore, in the open migration policy the education policy always
reinforces the possibility of a benecial brain gain relatively to the no
education policy case.
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5.2 Education Policy: Selective Migration Policy
For the selective migration policy, we also begin by deriving the migra-
tion conditions for skilled and unskilled workers. For the education and
the no education policy cases these are, respectively:
STpS2(0;1) :! (pS (h  ) + ) > h (1  T )
UTpU=0 : ! > 1  hT
ST=0pS2(0;1) :! (pS (h  ) + ) > h
UT=0pU=0 : ! > 1 (33)
Then, only the following individuals will acquire education:
c < cTpS2(0;1)  ! (pSh+ (1  pS) ) + (1  )h (1  T ) + Z + Th  1
c < cT=0pS2(0;1)  ! (pSh+ (1  pS) ) + (1  )h  1 (34)
From these two equations we can derive P TpS2(0;1) and P
T=0
pS2(0;1) to
study brain drain. Accordingly, as above we compute the derivatives of
P TpS2(0;1) and of P
T=0
pS2(0;1) with respect to ! and we evaluate them at the
skilled workersmigration threshold level (equation 33):

dPT
pS2(0;1)
d!

!=
h(1 T )
pS(h )+
= (1  )  pS (h  ) + 
(1   (h+ Z   1))2 > 0
dPT=0
pS2(0;1)
d!

!= h
pS(h )+
= (1  ) pS (h  ) + 
(1   (h  1))2 > 0 (35)
As such also under the selective migration policy, and due to the
absence of migration costs, a benecial brain gain is promoted inde-
pendently of education policy. Therefore, again what is important to
analyze is if the education policy increases the level of benecial brain
gain relatively to the no education policy case. To know this we compare
the brain drain conditions under the education policy and under the no
education policy cases:
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
dPT
pS2(0;1)
d!

!
h(1 T )
pS(h )+
 

dPT=0
pS2(0;1)
d!

!= h
pS(h )+
=
(1  ) (pS (h  ) + ) (Z((2 Z)+2)+
2(h 1)2+2h(1 Z) (h2 1) 1) 1
(1 (h+Z 1))2(1 (h 1))2 7 0
(36)
Then the education policy under the selective migration policy, and
contrary to what happens with the open migration policy, do not nec-
essarily increases the possibility of a benecial brain gain relatively to
the no education policy case. In particular, equation 36 tends to be neg-
ative when the parameters , h and Z are simultaneously very high31.
Accordingly, an education policy runs the risk of becoming ine¤ective:
the longer migrants stay in the destination country, since the external-
ities generated by the education subsidy are lower; the higher the skill
premium, given that this works by itself to promote education; and the
higher the education subsidy, because the opportunity costs of subsi-
dization become very large.
We have then seen that the selective migration policy might reduce
the success of education policies. So far, however, we do not know how
the selective migration policy does relatively to the open migration pol-
icy. Comparing the e¤ectiveness of the education policy under the open
and the selective migration policies, we obtain:

dPT
pS2(0;1)
d!

!=
h(1 T )
pS(h )+
 
h
dPTp=1
d!
i
!=1 T
=   (1  )  (1  pS) (h  )
(1   (h+ Z   1))2 < 0
(37)
The role of the education policy is therefore unambiguously weak-
ened under the selective migration policy relatively to the open migra-
tion policy. The rational for this result is once more illegal migration.
Accordingly, since illegal migration reduces the incentives of individuals
to acquire education, it also renders education policies less e¢ cient.
6 Robustness of Results
In this section we discuss the robustness of our results to two other
benecial brain gain channels (uncertain migration and remittances), to
the possibility of amnesties for the illegal and to a multi-country world.
31To see this note that the sign of equation 36 depends only on the term in the nu-
merator (all the remaining terms are positive). The cross derivative of the numerator
in relation to , h and Z equals  4.
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Start with uncertain migration. In the case analyzed in this paper,
when a potential migrant decides to migrate, he does so independently
of his legal status, i.e.: when is protable to migrate, an individual has
no uncertainty about his decision. Suppose, instead, that if a skilled
individual does not get a legal visa, he decides with probability qS to
not migrate and with probability (1  qS) to migrate regardless of the
illegality condition. As expected, the skilled individuals with no legal
visa that give up of migrating will contribute for a benecial brain gain.
However, this new formulation does not prevent the brain waste risk to
arise. Therefore, since the main mechanism in this paper is not a¤ected,
results are also not going to be qualitatively altered.
Consider now the case of remittances. Assume that each individual
that decides to take education in the origin country receives a remit-
tance R to nance his education32. This case is somewhat similar to the
education policy above. The only di¤erence is that now who pays for the
education of the young are not taxes from those that remain in the coun-
try, but emigrantstransfers. As such remittances will also contribute
to increase the education incentives of individuals in the origin country.
However, remittances do not eliminate the brain waste risk that skilled
individuals face under illegal migration. Therefore, again results from
our central case are going to be basically the same.
Next, we look at amnesties for illegal migrants. Imagine that an
individual that does not get legal status spends a share  2 (0; 1) of his
working life in the destination country as an illegal and a share (1  )
as a legal, due to amnesties to illegal migrants33. In this case the brain
waste risk will be reduced, but not totally eliminated. Therefore once
more our results are not going to be changed substantially. Furthermore,
politicians in recent years have been more reticent to apply amnesties
for illegal migrants. If this tendency continues, the amnesty channel for
reducing the brain waste risk will also become weaker34.
Finally, we discuss a multi-country world. Suppose that individuals
from the origin country can migrate to i = 1; 2; :::; n destination coun-
tries. For simplicity we further assume that all destination countries are
symmetric in every respect35. Think rst of a scenario where all desti-
32We do not consider remittances used for other purposes besides education. This
would only make a di¤erence if we also introduce credit constrained individuals.
33We can also interpret  as the probability of receiving an amnesty.
34Note that the brain waste risk can also a¤ect legal migrants, especially those
belonging to some ethnic groups or citizens from certain countries (Mattoo et al.,
2008). As such, results in this paper could be extended to more general cases of
brain waste, which do not include only illegal migrants.
35Accordingly, migrants tend to prefer countries with higher wages, with more job
opportunities, and closer in terms of geographical and cultural distance.
21
nation countries have the same migration policy (either the open or the
selective migration policy). In this case migrants will not have any pref-
erence for a particular destination country. However, this can change if
destination countries di¤er in the migration policy used. Accordingly,
skilled workers will prefer to migrate to countries with open migration
policies in order to reduce the brain waste risk. As a result, relatively
to a country with a selective migration policy, a country with an open
migration policy will be able to attract more skilled workers and there-
fore to achieve more easily a positive self-selection36. In addition, the
existence of destination countries with open migration policies can also
help origin countries to achieve a benecial brain gain, given that as we
have seen above, open migration policies increase education incentives.
7 Discussion
In this paper we have argued that since migration policies a¤ect mi-
grants legal status, then, they also a¤ect education incentives, brain
drain and self-selection. In particular, more open migration policies
tend to create less illegal migration than selective migration policies,
given that the latter has more restrictive criteria for admission. In this
sense we have compared an open migration policy where all migrants are
granted a legal visa, with a selective migration policy where migrants are
selected according to skills. Accordingly, under the selective migration
policy an individual that does not get a legal visa but decides to migrate
becomes an illegal migrant. This is specially penalizing for skilled ille-
gal migrants, because they most likely end up working as unskilled (i.e.:
brain waste). In other words, selective migration policies increase the
brain waste risk that skilled workers face when migrating.
We then showed that, relatively to the open migration policy, the
selective migration policy has several negative e¤ects. For the origin
country it reduces the incentives of individuals to acquire education; it
weakens the possibility of benecial brain gain to arise; and it dampens
the success of education policies. For the destination country, in turn,
it undermines the chances of a positive self-selection. We have also dis-
cussed that these results are robust to other benecial brain gain chan-
nels than temporary migration (uncertain migration and remittances),
to amnesties for illegal migrants and to a multi-country world.
Our model then carries out some interesting policy implications for
developed and developing countries. For developed countries the popu-
larity of selective migration policies might be misleading. In fact, instead
36In other words, countries with more open migration policies can cancel-out the
e¤ects of selective migration policies put in place in other countries.
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of attracting more skilled workers, this policy might on the contrary pre-
vent a positive self-selection. The rational for this result is that selective
migration policies, due to the brain waste risk, can reduce the incentives
of skilled workers to migrate. In turn, and now from the perspective of
developing countries, education policies cannot be seen independently
from the migration policies in developed countries, given that the latter
a¤ect the former. Accordingly, since selective migration policies from
destination countries can reduce the incentives of individuals to acquire
education in the origin countries, they can also cancel out any positive
e¤ects from education policies in the latter.
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